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INSURANCE-RECOVERY-EXTENT UNDER INTEREST LIMITATION CLAUSE OF
STANDARD FIRE INSURANCE POLICY - Plaintiff leased vacant land and
erected a building thereon. At the election of the lessor the lease could be
terminated upon thirty days' notice, plaintiff having the right to remove
the building. Defendant issued to plaintiff a policy insuring the building
against loss by fire to the extent of the cash value of the property at the time
of loss, but not exceeding the repair or replacement cost, "nor in any event
for more than the interest of the insured."1 The building was destroyed by
fire and plaintiff sued to recover the full amount of the insurance. The
trial court refused to admit defendant's proffered evidence that three months
prior to the fire plaintiff's lessor served notice terminating the lease and had
taken action to dispossess, and that plaintiff had made arrangements to
have the building demolished. On appeal, held, reversed. As affecting the
amount of the insured's recovery under the interest limitation clause and
as constituting a factor in the cost or value of the destroyed building the
evidence was properly excluded. However, such evidence should have been
admitted as bearing -on the question whether insured had any insurable
interest in the building.2 Federowicz. v. Potomac Insurance Co., 7 App. Div.
(2d) 330, 183 N.Y.S. (2d) 115 (1959).
Recovery under the New York standard fire insurance policy is limited
by the language "nor in any event for more than the interest of the insured."S
Superimposed on this stated limitation seems to be an unwritten limitation
which recognizes the fire insurance policy as a contract of indemnity only.4
Where the property interest of the insured is less than a fee, the interestlimitation clause and the indemnity principle would produce identical
THE

1
2

Z'/ N.Y. Consol. Laws (McKinney, 1949) §168; principal case at 331.

For insurance on property to be validly obtained, the insured must have an insurable
interest in the property. In the principal case there were provisions of the lease upon
which a finding might be made, in the absence of other proof, that upon giving notice to
remove and the failure of the tenant to remove within the required time the building ,
became the property of the lessor. If such were found, then the plaintiff would have no
insurable interest. See VANCE, INSURANCE §29 (1951).
8 This standard policy has been adopted in most of the states in the same form or with
only minor deviations; 1951 INS. L.J. 785 at 786-787; 48 N.W. UNIV. L. REv. 354 at 355,
n. 6 (1953). For general discussions of the standard fire insurance policy, see 42 CoL. L.
REv. 1227 (1942); 39 ILL. L. REv. 66 (1944); 20 J. AMER. INS, 15 (April 1943); 20 J,
AMER. INS. 9 (Sept. 1943).
4PATIERSON, EssENTIALS OF INSURANCE LAW, 2d ed., 137 (1957); 4 APPLEMAN, INSURANCE
§2107, pp. 10-11 (1941); 6 id., §3823.
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results since a determination of the amount for which indemnity will be
had is based on the extent of the property interest. However, where the
insured's property interest is a fee, different results would be reached depending on whether the interest-limitation clause or the indemnity principle were applied, since the factors used to measure each are different. Obviously the interest-limitation clause would be wholly ineffectual as a
limitation on recovery where the interest is a fee; there would be no limited
interest. In such a case, an otherwise unlimited recovery could still be
reduced by the application of the indemnity principle where the insured
suffered a financial loss of less than the value of the fee. Be this as it may,
considerable authority supports the proposition adopted in the principal
case that the holder of the fee in a building may recover the full value thereof, not exceeding the amount of insurance, regardless of other factors which
might tend to reduce or eliminate his actual financial loss.5 The holder of
the fee in betterments and improvements is similarly entitled to full recovery on a fire insurance policy when such betterments and improvements are
destroyed by fire. 6 Cases which are concerned with insurance of a less-thana-fee interest, a limited interest, generally limit recovery to an amount which
is compatible with both the limited-interest clause and the indemnity
principle. In these cases, the interest of the insured has been consistently
dealt with as his property interest, whether it be as lessee,1 vendor,s life
Ii Laurent v. Chatham Fire Ins. Co., 1 Hall (N.Y.) 45 (1828) (lease giving lessee right
to remove building was about to expire when fire destroyed building); First Nat. Bank
of Highland Park v. Boston Ins. Co., 17 Ill. (2d) 147, 160 N.E. (2d) 802 (1959) (land contract
vendor of buildings destroyed, contract price less than amount of insurance); Girard Ins. Co.
v. Taylor, 6 App. Div. (2d) 359, 177 N.Y.S. (2d) 42 (1958) (owner of land and building who
conveyed the land but retained the building with right to remove); Heidisch v. Globe and
Republic Ins. Co., 368 Pa. 602, 84 A. (2d) 566 (1951) (owner of property condemned by
eminent domain still held title); Rosenbloom v. Maryland Ins. Co., 258 App. Div. 14, 15
N.Y.S. (2d) 304 (1939) (building owner had contracted to sell land and build; after fire,
the land was sold by owner for only a slightly reduced price); Godwin v. Iowa State Ins.
Co., (Mo. App. 1930) 27 S.W. (2d) 464- (plaintiff prior to fire ordered building demolished); German Fire Ins. Co. v. Duncan, 140 Ky. 27, 130 S.W. 804 (1910) (vendor of land
who retained right to remove building); Irwin v. Westchester Fire Ins. Co., 58 Misc. 441,
109 N.Y.S. 612 (1908) (owner of a building declared to be a public nuisance and ordered
removed; fire destroyed the building prior to removal); Tiemann v. Citizens' Ins. Co., 76
App. Div. 5, 78 N.Y.S. 620 (1920) (vendor received full purchase price); Foley v. Manufacturers' & Builders' Fire Ins. Co., 152 N.Y. 131, 46 N.E. 318 (1897) (owner of building
partially completed at time of destruction; by his contract with insured, contractor was
liable for completion of the building); Washington Mills Emery Mfg. Co. v. Weymouth
& Braintree Mut. Fire Ins. Co., 135 Mass. 503 (1883); Washington Mills Emery Mfg. Co.
v. Commercial Fire Ins. Co., (C.C. Mass. 1882) 13 F. 646 (vendor of land who retained
ownership of building and right to remove; building was destroyed by fire).
6Modem Music Shop v. Concordia Fire Ins. Co., 131 Misc. 305,226 N.Y.S. 630 (1927)
(lessee made improvements over which he retained full ownership and right to remove
at termination of lease; improvements were destroyed by fire).
7 See Niblo v. North Amer. Ins. Co., 1 Sandf. (N.Y.) 551 (1848); Hale v. Simmons, 200
Ark. 556, 139 S.W. (2d) 696 (1940); Lighting Fixture Supply Co. v. Fidelity Union Fire
Ins. Co., (5th Cir. 1932) 55 F. (2d) llO; Sievers v. Union Assur. Society of London, (Cal.
1912) 128 P. 771.
s See Shotwell v. Jefferson Ins., 5 Bos. (N.Y.) 247 (1859); McWilliams v. Farm & City
Mut. Ins. Assn., 248 Iowa 233, 80 N.W. (2d) 320 (1957).
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tenant, 9 or mortgagee.10 When, in the principal case, the court in considering the interest of the insured looked to his property interest,11 it took a
sound view.12 The new interest-limitation clause replaced two of the "moral
hazard" provisions found in the old standard form.is These provided for
voidance of the policy if the interest of the insured was other than that of
unconditional and sole ownership or if the subject of the insurance was a
building on ground not owned by the insured in fee simple. These clauses
clearly dealt with the property interest of the insured. And the court correctly treated the new clause as having the effect of expanding the kinds of
property interests covered.14 But the court refused to recognize the effect
of the indemnity principle in the case of the holder of the fee.lls There are
a few cases which do apply the indemnity principle to limit recovery regardless of the extent of the property interest and deny to the holder of the full
legal title full recovery under a fire insurance policy upon the destruction
of the insured property.16 In such cases recovery is limited to the amount
of the financial loss sustained. And it seems proper that the nature of the
property interest of the insured should not affect the applicability of the
indemnity principle.1 1 Where there is an apparent conflict between the
interest-limitation clause and the indemnity principle, as there may be in
the case of insurance of a fee and as there is in the principal case, there is
no sound reason to reject the indemnity principle.1 8
Roger W. Kapp

9See Hartford Ins. v. Haas, 87 Ky. 531, 9 S.W. 720 (1888); Beekman v. Fulton &
Montgomery Mut. Ins. Co., 66 App. Div. 72, 73 N.Y.S. 110 (1901); Convis v. Citizens Mut.
Fire Ins. Co., 127 Mich. 616, 86 N.W. 994 (1901); Western Assur. v. Stoddard, 88 Ala. 606,
7 S. 379 (1889); Agricultural Ins. v. Yates, 10 Ky. L. Rep. 984 (1889); Andes Ins. Co. v.
Fish, 71 Ill. 620 (1874).
10 See Kemochan v. N.Y. Bowery Ins., 5 Duer (N.Y.) I (1855); In re Clover Ridge
Planting & Mfg. Co., 178 La. 302, 151 S. 212 (1933); Saverese v. Ohio Farmers Ins. Co., 260
N.Y. 45, 182 N.E. 665 (1932).
11 See principal case at 336.
12See PATTERSON, ESSENTIALS OF INSURANCE LAw, 2d ed., 141 (1957); Godfrey, "Some
Limited Interest Problems," 15 LAW AND CoNTEM. PROB. 415 at 417 (1950); 48 N.W. UNIV.
L. REv. 354 at 355 (1953); 1950 INS. L.J. 722 at 725; 20 J. AMER. INS. IO (Sept. 1943).
13 See N.Y. Sess. Laws (1917) c. 440.
14 See principal case at 335.
15 Id. at 336.
16 Ramsdell v. Ins. Co. of North America, 197 Wis. 136, 221 N.W. 654 (1928); Glens
Falls Ins. Co. v. Sterling, (Md. 1959) 148 A. (2d) 453 (building partially completed when
destroyed by windstorm; no pecuniary loss suffered because contractor was obliged to
submit completed building); Edlin v. Security Ins. Co., (S.D. Ill. 1957) 160 F. Supp. 487;
Tauriello v. Aetna Ins. Co., 14 N.J. Super. 530, 82 A. (2d) 226 (1951).
J.7 See PATTERSON, EssENTIALS OF INSURANCE LAw, 2d ed., 142 (1957); Bonbright and
Katz, "Valuation of Property To Measure Fire Insurance Losses," 29_ CoL. L. REv. 857 at
888, 898-899 (1929).
18 See Flint Frozen Food v. Firemen's Ins. Co., 8 N.J. 606, 86 A. (2d) 233 (1952) (full
payment of debt owed was made after insured chattels were destroyed by fire).

